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Abstract
Equity researches are conducted by professionals, who also provide buy/hold/sell recommenda-
tions to investors. Nowadays, target prices determined by financial analysts are publicly available
to investors, who may decide to use them for investment purposes. Studying the accuracy of such
analysts’ forecasts is, thus, of paramount importance.
Based upon empirical data on 50 of the biggest (larger capitalisation) European stocks over a
15–year period, from 2004 to 2019 and using a panel data approach, this is the first study looking
at overall accuracy in European stock markets.
We find that Bloomberg’s 12-month consensus target prices have no predictive over future
market prices. Panel results are robust to company fixed effects and sub-period analysis. These
results are in line with the (mostly US-based) evidence in the literature.
Extending common practice, we perform a comparative accuracy analysis, comparing the accu-
racy of target prices with that of simple capitalisations of current prices. It turns out target prices
are not better in forecasting, than simple capitalisations. More interestingly, by analysing also the
relationship between both measures – target prices and capitalised prices – we find evidence that
capitalised prices partially explain how target prices are determined.
Even when considering individual regressions, accuracy is still very low, but varies considerably
across stocks.
Keywords: Target prices, forecast accuracy, panel data analysis.
JEL codes: C33, G14, G17, G24
1 Introduction
Currently, millions of shares are traded daily on world markets. Investors who buy and sell shares wonder
if they are trading at the right/fair prices.
Defenders of market efficiency would claim market prices are “fair”, by definition, and that there is
no added value to stock picking. Still, financial markets are full of financial analysts that keep analysing
stocks and providing buy/hold/sell recommendations, suggesting its is possible to “beat” the market,
by investing according to their advise.
∗Corresponding author. ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa and CEMAPRE/REM Research Center. Rua do Quelhas 6,
1200-078 Lisboa, Portugal. E-mail: Rmgaspar@iseg.ulisboa.pt. R.M. Gaspar was partially supported by the Project
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These analysis typically also provide so-called “price targets”. According to Bilinski et al. (2013) “a
target price forecast reflects the analyst’s estimate of the firm’s stock price level in 12 months, providing
easy to interpret, direct investment advice”.
Nowadays, price targets determined by financial analysts are available to investors via platforms
such as Bloomberg you even Yahoo Finance and can, therefore, be used for defining investment strate-
gies. Although price targets may vary from analyst to analyst, depending on the models they use and
parameter estimations, one can rely on general statistics also provided by financial data platforms.
In this study we use Bloomberg’s 12–month consensus target prices for 50 of the highest captitali-
sation European stocks, over the past 15 years and look into their predictive power.
We use panel regressions to study analysts’ target prices accuracy for the European stock market.
Besides Bonini et al. (2010), that focus on Italian stocks alone, this is the first study providing European
evidence on target price accuracy.
Our results are in line with the (mostly US-based) literature suggesting that globally average prices
targets have no predictive power.
In addition, we propose our own 12–month forecast statistic based on simple capitalisation of current
prices. This kind of comparative accuracy analysis is very informative and new in the literature. Unques-
tionably naive, our forecast measure proves to have the same level of (non-) accuracy of analysts’ target
prices, suggesting both forecasts are equally (non) reliable. Although globally it slightly outperforms
target prices, the differences are too small to be statistically meaningful. By also studying the relation-
ship between both forecasts, in terms of informativeness, we conclude that target prices and capitalised
prices contain different types of information, as at least globally they prove to be uncorrelated.
The full sample findings are robust to the consideration of firm-specific fixed effects and sub-period
analysis. Concretely we look at three sub-periods: pre-crise period (until the end of August 2008), crise
(between September 2008 and end of 2012) and post-crise period (from 2013 onwards). Despite their
consistently bad accuracy of target prices, no matter the sub-period, it we found analysts were pessimist
over the crise, contradicting the full-sample results where we attest their, previously well documented
optimism.
The remaining of the text is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature overview.
Section 3 describes the data and research design. Section 4 presents and discuss the results. Finally,
Section 5 summarises the main findings and discuss possible limitations of our approach.
2 Literature Overview
The discussion about whether or not price targets can be used to “beat” the market is related to the
much older, but on-going debate about passive versus active portfolio management, or even the more
general discussion, about the market efficiency. See Fama (1965), Fama et al. (1969), Barr Rosenberg
and Lanstein (1984), Sharpe (1991), Admati and Pfleiderer (1997), Sorensen et al. (1998), Malkiel
(2003), Shukla (2004), French (2008), Vermorken et al. (2013) or Cao et al. (2017), or Elton et al.
(2019), to mention just a few over time.
Although the literature about market efficiency presents mixed evidence depending, on concrete
markets, asset classes and/or forms of efficiency under analysis (see Dimson and Mussavian (1998)
overview), there seems to be an agreement that, in particular for large capitalisation stocks, markets
are supposed to be at least semi-strong efficient. That is, one should not be able to trade profitably
on the basis of publicly available information, such as analyst recommendations and target prices.
Nonetheless, research departments of brokerage houses spend large sums of money on security analysis
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– with particular emphasis on large capitalisation stocks) – presumably because these firms and their
clients believe its use can generate superior returns (Barber et al., 2001), suggesting markets may not
be that efficient.
Besides the non-efficiency argument, it could also be that target prices act in financial markets as
self-fulfilling prophecies. See, for instance the early and recent overviews in Krishna (1971) and Zulaika
(2007), respectively. A self-fulfilling prophecy is an event that is caused only by the preceding prediction
or expectation that it was going to occur. If extremely large numbers of people base trading decisions on
the same indicators, thereby using the same information to take their positions and in turn push the price
in the predicted direction. The self-fulfilling prophecy argument as been mostly used in studies about
financial bubbles (Garber, 1989), market cycles (Farmer Roger, 1999) or panics (Calomiris and Mason,
1997), but also to justify some industry (theoretically odd) trading practices, such as technical analysis
(Menkhoff, 1997; Oberlechner, 2001; Reitz, 2006) and momentum (Jordan, 2014), for instance. Most
analysts determining price targets work at high status entities such as consulting firms and investment
banks. It turns out that the reputation of these entities ultimately could influences significantly the
behavior of investors, in our view, supporting the self-fulling argument.
Early investigations on markets impact of analysts are primarily related to the market’s reaction
to revisions in either analysts’ earnings forecasts or recommendations. For example, Abdel-Khalik and
Ajinkya (1982) find significant abnormal returns during the publication week of forecast revisions by
Merrill Lynch analysts. Similarly, Lys and Sohn (1990) present evidence consistent with forecast revisions
having information content (see also Stickel (1991)).
Later studies on target prices’ informativeness examine their predictability either in the short term
or long term. While they unanimously document a significant short-term market reaction to the release
of target prices (Brav and Lehavy, 2003; Asquith et al., 2005; Bradshaw et al., 2013), many find little
evidence of target prices’ long-term predictability (Bonini et al., 2010; Da and Schaumburg, 2011;
Bradshaw et al., 2013).
Indeed, Bonini et al. (2010) find that analysts’ forecasting ability of target prices is limited. And
Bradshaw et al. (2013) find no evidence of persistence in forecasting accuracy of target prices. On the
contrary, covering data from 16 countries, Bilinski et al. (2013) provide evidence that analysts have
differential and persistent skill to issue accurate target price forecasts
More recent studies on target price focus, either on the determinants of target prices (Da et al.,
2016) or on exploring possible relationship between their accuracy and a variety of analysts, markets,
accounting systems (Bradshaw et al., 2019), firm or governance (Cheng et al., 2019) characteristics
among others, happily ignoring the fact most evidence point to possible very low accuracy levels .
In this study we go back to accucary evaluation, providing empirical evidence on the virtually
unexplored European stock market.
3 Data & Methodology
3.1 Data
This study focuses on stock of 50 major (high capitalization) European companies. From all the
constituents of EURO STOXX 50 index during the past 15 years, we chose the 50 companies that
stayed the longest in the index. Concretely, we look at the companies listed in Table 1.
From Table 1 it is clear we do not focus in any particular country or sector, as the listed companies
belong to variety of country and all sort of sectors, from Air Fright & Logistics; Airspace & Defense;
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Table 1: List of European stocks under analysis (by alphabetic order)
Adidas BASF E.ON L’Oreal Schneider Electric SE
Air Liquide Bayer ENEL LVMH Siemens
Airbus BNP Paribas ENI Mucich RE Societe Generale
Allianz BMW Essilor Nokia Telefonica
Anheuser Danone Fresenius Orange Total
ASML Carrefour Iberdrola Repsol Unicredit
Assicurazioni Daimler Inditex Safran Unilever
AXA Deutsche Bank ING Saint-Gobain Vinci
Banco Bilbao Deutsche Post Intesa Sanpaolo Sanofi Vivendi
Banco Santander Deutsche Telekom Philips SAP Volkswagen
Automobile manufactures; Chemicals; Construction & Engineering; Consumer durables & Apparel;
Diversified chemicals; Diversified banks; Electric Components & Equipment; Electric Utilities; Food
Products; Food, beverage & Tobacco; Health Care Equipments; Industrial Conglomerates; Integrated
Oil & Gas; Integrated Telecommunication Services; Movies & Entertainment; Multi-line Insurance;
Personal Products; Pharmaceuticals; Real State; Reinsurance; Retailing; Semiconductors, Software;
Technology Hardware & Equipment; to Hypermarkets, supermarkets, convenience stores, cash & carry,
e-commerce.
For each of the companies under analysis we collected weekly (close) prices and the so-called
Bloomberg’s 12-month consensus target prices , from 2004-04-27 until 2019-04-23, providing us with
a total of 78,300 observations (783 observations our each variable and stock).
Our accuracy analysis is based upon three variables: observed futures prices (FP), 12-month ahead
target prices (TP) forecasts on FP and capitalised prices (CP) forecasts for the same FP obtained
market prices observed one year before.
Definition 3.1. We denote by FP it, the future price (FP) of company i observed at the future date
t. TPit is the 12-month target price for date t, observed one year in advance, i.e. at t − 52, weekly
observed data. CPit is the capitalised price of company i for date t, determined as
CPit = Pi,t−52 × eR̄i×52 (1)
where Pi,t−52 the market price of company i observed one year in advance at date t− 52 and R̄ is the
weekly average past return of company i.
Using the above definition, TPt and CPt are one-year ahead forecasts for FPt.
3.2 Research Design
Our predictive power analysis relies mostly on panel data regressions.
The idea is to analyse to which extent can analysts target prices (TP) forecast futures prices (FP)
and compare their forecasting performance to that of using simple capitalisations of current market
prices – capitalised prices (CP). By also regressing target prices on the mentioned capitalised prices,
one can also get an idea about how much in target prices actually result from simple capitalisation
rules.
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Table 2: Panel unit root test results
Future Prices (FP) TargetPrices (TP) Capitalised Prices (CP)
Method Statistic Prob Statistic Prob Statistic Prob
LLC 6.755 1.000 7.966 1.000 7.074 1.000
IPS 6.156 1.000 8.492 1.000 6.635 1.000
ADF– Fisher 60.653 0.999 39.983 0.999 53.817 1.000
PP–Fisher 57.242 1.000 40.002 1.000 49.630 1.000
Results of the LLC (Levin, Lin, and Chu, 2002), that as null hyphothesis assumes common unit root process, and IPS
(Im, Pesaran, and Shin, 2003), Fisher-type (Choi, 2001) tests that as null hypothesis assume individual unit root process.
Considering a cross-section of 50 time series, individual effects as exogenous variables, and automatic maximum lags and
lag length selection based on SIC (Schwarz et al., 1978). Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using as assymptotic
Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
Thus, we look into three types of pairwise relationships:
(A) FP versus TP, we evaluate the accuracy of TP forecasts made by analysts.
(B) FP versus CP, to compare the accuracy of a forecast as naive as CP to analysts TP forecast.
(C) TP versus CP, to evaluate to which extent TP can be determined by CP.
The basic linear panel models used in econometrics can be described through suitable restrictions of
the following general model:
yit = αit + βitxit + uit (2)
where represents a uit a random disturbance term of mean 0.
In our case, yit is either FPit (in (A) and (B) listed above) or TPit (for (C)) and xit is either TPit
(in (A)) or CPit (in (B) and (C), with FPit, TPit and CPit as in the variables Definition 3.1, whenever
we are considering in level panel regressions. For in difference panel regressions, we consider accordingly,
its differences ∆FPit = FPit − FPi,t−1, ∆TPit = TPit − TPi,t−1, and ∆CPit = CPit − CPi,t−1 .
Table 2 and the correlograms in the appendix (Figure A1 ) show that our panel variables – FP, TP
and CP are non-stacionary. In fact, In fact, the are integrated of other one1.
Therefore, when regressing our level panel variables on one another, one needs to be very careful
with interpretations, as mostly likely they are spurious relationships. For further discussion on spurious
relationship identification, see, for instance Granger et al. (2001).
Nonetheless, intercept coefficients of level regressions can be interpreted as optimism/pessimism
indicators (forecast bias), when we use target prices as predictors of future prices.
On the other hand, accuracy can only be properly evaluated from in differences panel regressions .
For completeness in Section 4 (or in the appendix), we always present regression results both in levels
and differences.
1’Order of integration’ is a summary statistic used to describe a unit root process in time series analysis. Specifically,
it tells you the minimum number of differences needed to get a stationary series (Engle and Granger, 1991).
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3.2.1 Overall panel regressions
We start by considering parameter homogeneity, i.e αit = α and βit = β for all i, t.
The resulting model
yit = α+ βxit + uit (3)
is a standard linear model pooling all the data across i and t.
This is the most common panel model and by considering fixed parameters, we aim to evaluate the
overall relationship between y and x.
Then we consider two less restrictive models: cross fixed effects models and period fixed effect
models
3.2.2 Panel robustness
We evaluate the overall panel regression results in two way: by considering individual company fixed
effects and by performing sub-period panel regressions.
To model individual company heterogeneity, we assume that the error term in (3) has two separate
components, one of which, µi is firm-specific and does not change over time,
uit = µi + εit (4)
where it is now εit that is a random disturbance term of mean 0, and µi is firm-specific and does not
change over time.
By replacing (4) in the general Equation (3) we obtain
yit = α+ βxit + µi + εit . (5)
As in our case it is likely to have the individual component to be correlated with the regressors, the
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator of β would be inconsistent, so it is customary to treat the µi as
a further set of n parameters to be estimated, as if in the general model αit = αi = α+ µi for all t.
In panel data slang µi are called fixed effects (a.k.a. within or least squares dummy variables)
model, estimated by OLS on transformed data, guaranteeing consistent estimates for β.
Testing robustness of results from a different perspective, we also perform classical panel regressions
(as in (3)), but instead of the full sample we consider three different sub-periods:
• the pre-crise period, until the end of August 2008,
• the crise period, from September 2008 until the end of 2012, and
• the pots crise period, from 2013 onwards.
3.2.3 Individual regressions
Finally, we also consider individual regressions, which is the same as allowing both coefficients αi and
βi to vary for each form
yit = αi + βixit + uit . (6)
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the three variables – future prices (FP), target prices (TP) and capitalised
prices (CP) – for the 8 best performing companies over the 15–year period of our sample. Their non-
stationary is also clear.
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Figure 1: Comparison of target prices (TP) and capitalised prices (CP) with actual future prices (FP)
Target prices (TP: orange lines) and capitalised prices (CP: grey lines) forecasts for the indicated date t, jointly with
actually observed future prices (FP: blue lines) at t, for the 8 best performing companies over the 15–year period of our
sample: Adidas, Anheuser, ASML, Essilor, Fresenius, Inditex, Safran, Volkswagen.
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4 Results
4.1 Overall panel regressions
Table 3 summarises the overall panel regression results (Figure 2 illustrates them). We choose to report
the results on both in level and in difference regressions.
As previously discussed level regressions should be interpreted with extreme care, as we are dealing
with non-stationary variables (recall results in Table 2), and the relationships are, as expected, indeed
spurious. The extremely small Durbin-Watson statistic value of the level regressions reported in Table
3 (0.019, 0.047 and 0.037) their spurious nature2. In practical terms this means that, based upon level
regressions we cannot that conclusions on the relationship between the dependent and independent
variables – we cannot interpret dependent variables coefficients nor use regression statistics to attest
models quality. Still, we can interpret the constant coefficient and its significance.
From level results columns – (1), (3) and (5) in 3 – we show evidence that
• in our overall sample and on average, target prices overestimate future prices (positive and sta-
tistically significant negativeα = −1.424) ,
• while capitalised prices tend to under estimate them (positive and statistically significant positive
α = −1.789).
This is in line with the literature attesting that the majority of target prices are too optimistic, supporting
theoretical predictions by Ottaviani and Sörensen (2006), in line with Bonini et al. (2010) results.
In terms of forecast accuracy what can be interpreted are the results for the regressions in differences.
Form the analysis of the in difference results – columns (2), (4) and (6) in Table 3 – we can conclude
that,
• overall, there is no evidence that target prices can forecast future prices – second column of
results in Table 3). In fact the regression not only shows and R2 of 0.000, but also the coefficient
associated with independent variable is also not statistically different from zero (as attested by
its t-statistics).
• although is true we also find no forecasting power in the simple capitalisation rule forecasts from
Equation – fourth column of results in able 3 – as we observe an R2 of 0.001, in this case the
coefficient associated with the dependent variable is at least statistically different from zero.
• we also find that the ability capitalised prices have to explain analysts forecasts is very limited –
sixth column of results in Table 3. In fact, we only get an R2 = 0.008. Nonetheless, in relative
terms this regression is the “best”, as attested by the all model selection statistics.
2 According to Granger et al. (2001), we should suspect that a regression is spurious if R2 > d, where d is the
Durbin-Watson statistic, which is the case for all level regressions and not the case for the regressions in differences.
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Table 3: Overall Panel Regressions
FP vs TP FP vs CP TP vs CP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable FP ∆FP FP ∆FP TP ∆TP
Mean dependent var 38.516 0.070 38.516 0.070 48.456 0.057
S.D. Dependent var 39.241 1.839 39.241 1.839 42.886 1.758
Intercept
Coefficient -1.424 0.069 1.789 0.068 8.433 0.051
Std. Error 0.134 0.010 0.085 0.010 0.096 0.009
t-Statistic -10.590 7.192 20.922 7.012 87.712 5.525
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Independent Variable TP ∆TP CP ∆CP CP ∆CP
Coefficient 0.824 0.007 0.916 0.029 0.999 0.081
Std. Error 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.004
t-Statistic 396.586 1.215 613.740 5.851 594.747 17.470
Prob. 0.000 0.224 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Regression Statistics
R-squared 0.811 0.000 0.912 0.001 0.906 0.008
Adjusted R-squared 0.811 0.000 0.912 0.001 0.906 0.008
S.E. Of regression 17.040 1.839 11.670 1.838 13.124 1.750
Sum square resid 106.123 123419.8 4977847 123309.2 6295006 111837.6
Log Likelihood -155501.3 -740254.9 -141666.9 -74008.5 -145957.1 -72226.4
F-statistic 157280.5 1.476 376676.4 34.241 353723.7 305.203
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.224 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Model Statistics
AIC 8.509 4.056 7.752 4.055 7.987 3.958
SIC 8.509 4.057 7.753 4.056 7.987 3.958
HQC 8.509 4.056 7.752 4.056 7.987 3.958
Residuals Autocorr.
Durbi-Watson stat 0.019 2.055 0.047 2.055 0.037 2.007
Regression results using panel least squares based upon 36550 balanced panel observations (with a total of 731 periods
included and 50 cross-sections). Panel variables are future prices (FP), target prices (TP) and capitalised prices (CP).
Each column represents a specific panel regression as in Equation (3). We regress FP on TP, FP on CP and TP on CP,
both in levels and differences. We report the model selection criteria of Akaike (1973) (AIC), (Schwarz et al., 1978) (SIC)
and Hannan and Quinn (1979) (HQC). For residual autocorrelation we use the panel data generalization by Bhargava
et al. (1982) of the classical Durbin and Watson (1950) statistic.
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Figure 2: Panel Regression
(a) FP vs TP
(b) FP vs CP
(c) TP vs CP
Illustration of the panel regressions of Table 3. On the left-hand-side images of level regressions and on the right-hand-side
of regressions in differences.
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4.2 Panel robustness
Considering company fixed effects does not change considerably the “picture”, in terms of accuracy
(see in difference columns (2),(4) and (6) of Table A1, in the appendix), so it seems
• that the reason why, overall, our forecast variables (both TP and CP ) have no predicting power
over future prices cannot be explain by firm-specific components.
As before the in level regressions (columns (2),(4) and (6) of Table A1, in the appendix) are spurious.
However, looking deeper into the variation firm-specific estimates (µi in Equation 4, illustrated at Figure
3 ), it seems we can conclude
• firm-specific variables may explain optimism/pessimism in target prices forecasts, as we get a
wide range of µi values.
Figure 3: Company fixed effects
Results also do no change much, when considering panel regressions over the three proposed sub-
periods: pre-crisis, crise and post-crises.
Table 4 summarises the relevant statistics on the sub-period panel regressions (see full results for
each of the sub-periods in Tables A2, A3 and A4, in the appendix). Looking across periods its seems
• analysts became particularly pessimistic during the crise-period (positive and significative α =
5.4675 crise period level intercept), and optimist in the post-crise period (negative and significative
α = −1.02577 for the equivalent post-crise intercept),
• absence of accuracy, of both target prices and capitalised prices got even more severe during the
crisis period (lowest adjusted-R2)
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Table 4: Summary of subperiod panel regression results
Panel A: FP vs TP
Pre-crise Crise Post-crise
In level (1)
Intercept 3.15669*** 5.467543*** -1.025766***
In Differences (2)
Intercept 0.036918*** 0.038144 00̇97836***
Independent Variable 0.016726** 00̇00336 0-086016***
Adjusted R-squared 0.000485 0.000089 0.001118
Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.19534 3.755410 4.451777
Panel B: FP vs CP
Pre-crise Crise Post-crise
In level (3)
Intercept 2.219831*** 2.480338*** 2.701088***
In Differences (4)
Intercept 0.027395** 0.038147** 0.102555***
Independent Variable 0.089025*** 0.000953 0.032768***
Adjusted R-squared 0.004987 0.000088 0.001179
Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.190830 3.755 4.451717
4.3 Individual Regressions
Perhaps most interesting are the individual sample results. Tables 5 – 7 show individual time series
regressions, for the 8 best performing companies (the ones in Figure 1).
In general, when considering individual time series the R2 for in difference regressions increase.
• For each of the individual companies considered, accuracy is not as bad as in the overall sample,
the R2 levels of the “FP vs TP” regressions range from 0.0012 (Inditex) to 0.1157 (Safran),
suggesting that the accuracy target prices is less than 12%, and varies considerably from firm to
firm.
• Similarly, R2 levels of the “FP vs CP” regressions range from 0.0021 (Essilor) to 0.1214 (Volk-
swagen), suggesting similar levels of accuracy of the two forecasts with target prices doing better
to some firms, and capitalised prices to other.
• Interesting, is the fact that the highest R2 levels are found for the “TP vs CP” regressions, where
the R2 levels range from 0.0904 (Fresenius) to has high as 0.3685 (Adidas), suggesting that at
least between 10% to 35% of target prices can be explained by simple capitalisation rules.
Figures A2 – A9 illustrate the individual regression results.
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Table 5: Future Prices versus Target Prices: individual asset results
(a) In levels
(b) In differences
Individual regressions of future prices (FP) on target prices (TP): (a) in levels FPt = α+βTPt +εt and (b) in differences
∆FPt = α+ β∆TPt + εt.
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Table 6: Future Prices versus Capitalised Prices: individual asset results
(a) In levels
(b) In differences
Individual regressions of future prices (FP) on capitalised prices (CP): (a) in levels FPt = α + βCPt + εt and (b) in
differences ∆FPt = α+ β∆CPt + εt.
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Table 7: Target Prices versus Capitalised Prices: individual asset results
(a) In levels
(b) In differences
Individual regressions of Target prices (FP) on capitalised prices (CP): (a) in levels TPt = α + βCPt + εt and (b) in
differences ∆TPt = α+ β∆CPt + εt.
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5 Conclusion
Our empirical evidence indicate that, in the European stock market, consensus 12-month target prices
are non accurate forecasts for future markets prices. It also shows target prices by analysts do not even
’beat’ the accuracy of capitalise prices as forecasters of future prices (both do similarly bad).
That is at least the case for large capitalisation stocks, as our same considers stocks form the
50 European companies that stayed the longest in the Eurostoxx index, over the past 15 years. If,
as Falkenstein (1996) suggests research intensity should be positively related with accuracy, due to a
learning effect, and, analogously prediction errors should be inversely related with some market factors
like size and liquidity, then accuracy on smaller cap companies is expected to be even worse.
Despite the spurious nature of in level panel regressions and the extreme low explanatory power
of in difference regressions we found evidence, that the overall target prices are positively biases, as
suggested by Ottaviani and Sörensen (2006), although, based upon our sub-period analysis, that was
during the European crise period (both global financial and sovereign debt), between September 2009
and 2012. In fact during those times analysts were overall pessimistic.
The individual regression analysis, seem to indicate the overall low accuracy, may result from con-
siderable variety in individual firm accuracy and bias size. Nonetheless, we still observe target prices and
capitalised prices are just slightly more accurate predictors of future prices and, if anything, capitalised
prices seems to do better.
Although possible polemical, from the industry perspective, our findings are in line with most
academic literature.
One of the limitations of our analysis is the fact we rely on Bloomberg consensus 12-month market
prices that are averages of individual analysts forecasts. It could be, a concrete analyst would perform
much better (necessarily others would need to perform worse) at particular time periods and/or for a
particular set of companies. However, unless the “good” forecasters are always the same, it is unlikely
investors would risk following a particular analyst or set of analysts, instead of the industry consensus.
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Figure A1: Correlograms of our Panel variables
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Table A1: Overall Panel Regression: cross fixed effects
FP vs TP FP vs CP TP vs CP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable FP ∆FP FP ∆FP TP ∆TP
Mean dependent var 38.516 0.070 38.516 0.070 48.456 0.057
S.D. Dependent var 39.241 1.839 39.241 1.839 42.886 1.758
Intercept
Coefficient -0. 811 0.069406 4.186 0.068 14.029 0.051
Std. Error 0.179 0.010 0.108 0.010 0.09 0.009
t-Statistic -4.532 7.212 38.883 7.033 153.288 5.542
Prob. 0.000 0. 0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Independent Variable TP ∆TP CP ∆CP CP ∆CP
Coefficient 0.812 0.004 0.857 0.026 0.859 0.080
Std. Error 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.005
t-Statistic 246.739 0.757 382.297 5.401 450.965 1.706
Prob. 0.000 0.449 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Regression Statistics
R-squared 0.843 0.003 0.916 0.004 0.949 0.010
Adjusted R-squared 0.843 0.001 0.916 0.002 0.949 0.009
S.E. Of regression 15.544 1.838 11.350 1.837 9.649 1.750
Sum square resid 8 819 023 123 084 4 701 829 122 988 3 398 162 111 608
Log Likelihood -152 118 -73 975 -140 624 -73 960 -134 690.1 -72 188
F-statistic 3 928.6 2.014 8 007.9 2.588 13 710.0 7.608
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Model Statistics
AIC 8.327 4.056 7.698 4.055 7.373 3.958
BIC 8.339 4.068 7.710 4.067 7.385 3.970
HQC 8.330 4.060 7.701 4.059 7.377 3.962
Residuals Autocorr.
Durbi-Watson stat 0.022 2.061 0.047 2.061 0.058 2.081
Regression results using panel least squares based upon 36550 balanced panel observations (with a total of 731 periods
included and 50 cross-sections) with fixed effects. Panel variables are future prices (FP), target prices (TP) and capitalised
prices (CP). Each column represents a specific panel regression as in Equation (4)–(5). We regress FP on TP, FP on CP
and TP on CP, both in levels and differences. We report the model selection criteria of Akaike (1973) (AIC), (Schwarz
et al., 1978) (SIC) and Hannan and Quinn (1979) (HQC). For residual autocorrelation we use the panel data generalization
by Bhargava et al. (1982) of the classical Durbin and Watson (1950) statistic.
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Table A2: Pre–crise period Panel Regressions
FP vs TP FP vs CP TP vs CP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable FP ∆FP FP ∆FP TP ∆TP
Mean dependent var 28.077 0.035 28.077 0.035 41.649 0.135
S.D. Dependent var 23.214 1.196 23.214 1.196 35.118 1.750
Intercept
Coefficient 3.157 0.037 2.220 0.027 0.992 0.124
Std. Error 0.164 0.013 0.143 0.013 0.152 0.019
t-Statistic 19.289 2.873 15.503 2.135 6.527 6.590
Prob. 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.000
Independent Variable TP ∆TP CP ∆CP CP ∆CP
Coefficient 0.598 0.017 0.931 0.089 1.464 0.132
Std. Error 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.013 0.004 0.020
t-Statistic 199.172 -2.285 235.154 6.678 348.352 6.775
Prob. 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Regression Statistics
R-squared 0.819 0.001 0.863 0.005 0.933 0.005
Adjusted R-squared 0.819 0.000 0.863 0.005 0.933 0.005
S.E. Of regression 9.868 1.195 8.580 1.193 9.107 1.746
Sum square resid 851 841 12 426 643 983 12 370 725 530 26 514
Log Likelihood -32 446 -13 895 -31 222 -13 876 -31 744 -17 192
F-statistic 39 670 5.220 55 297 4.460 121 349 45.898
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Model Statistics
AAIC 7.417 3.195 7.137 3.190 7.256 3.953
SIC 7.418 3.196 7.139 3.192 7.258 3.954
HQC 7.417 3.195 7.138 3.191 7.257 3.953
Residuals Autocorr.
Durbi-Watson stat 0.027 2.072 0.028 2.067 0.056 1.944
Regression results using panel least squares based upon 8750 balanced panel observations (with a total of 135 periods
included and 50 cross-sections). Panel variables are future prices (FP), target prices (TP) and capitalised prices (CP).
Each column represents a specific panel regression as in Equation (3). We regress FP on TP, FP on CP and TP on CP,
both in levels and differences. We report the model selection criteria of Akaike (1973) (AIC), (Schwarz et al., 1978) (SIC)
and Hannan and Quinn (1979) (HQC). For residual autocorrelation we use the panel data generalization by Bhargava
et al. (1982) of the classical Durbin and Watson (1950) statistic.
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Table A3: Crise period Panel Regressions
FP vs TP FP vs CP TP vs CP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable FP ∆FP FP ∆FP TP ∆TP
Mean dependent var 26.324 0.038 26.324 0.038 41.647 0.073
S.D. Dependent var 22.156 1.582 22.156 1.582 33.856 2.539
Intercept
Coefficient 5.468 0.038 2.480 0.038 3.087 0.072
Std. Error 0.213 0.015 0.158 0.015 0.187 0.024
t-Statistic 25.705 2.557 15.672 2 557854 16.495 -3.008
Prob. 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.003
Independent Variable TP ∆TP CP ∆CP CP ∆CP
Coefficient 0.501 0.000 0.816 0.001 1.320 0.026
Std. Error 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.013
t-Statistic 126.367 0.057 194.373 0.117 265.826 1.947
Prob. 0.000 0.954 0.000 0.907 0.000 0.052
Regression Statistics
R-squared 0.586 0.000 0.770 0.000 0.862 0.000
Adjusted R-squared 0.586 0.000 0.770 0.000 0.862 0.000
S.E. Of regression 14.262 1.582 10.631 1.582 12.570 2.539
Sum square resid 2298141 28138 1276771 28138 1785249 72490
Log Likelihood -46064 -21120 -42743 -21120 -44637 -26443
F-statistic 15969 0.003 37781 0.014 70664 3.791
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.954 0.000 0.907 0.000 0.052
Model Statistics
AIC 8.153 3.755 7.566 3.755 7.901 4.701
SIC 8.155 3.756 7.567 3.756 7.902 4.703
HQC 8.154 3.755 7.566 3.755 7.901 4.702
Residuals Autocorr.
Durbi-Watson stat 0.0203 2.2066 0.0417 2.2067 0.0761 2.2790
Regression results using panel least squares based upon 11300 balanced panel observations (with a total of 226 periods
included and 50 cross-sections). Panel variables are future prices (FP), target prices (TP) and capitalised prices (CP).
Each column represents a specific panel regression as in Equation (3). We regress FP on TP, FP on CP and TP on CP,
both in levels and differences. We report the model selection criteria of Akaike (1973) (AIC), (Schwarz et al., 1978) (SIC)
and Hannan and Quinn (1979) (HQC). For residual autocorrelation we use the panel data generalization by Bhargava
et al. (1982) of the classical Durbin and Watson (1950) statistic.
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Table A4: Post–crise period Panel Regressions
FP vs TP FP vs CP TP vs CP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable FP ∆FP FP ∆FP TP ∆TP
Mean dependent var 52.401 0.107 52.401 0.107 56.730 0.106
S.D. Dependent var 49.365 2.242 49.365 2.242 50.105 0.895
Intercept
Coefficient -1.026 0.098 2.701 0.103 5.021 0.093
Std. Error 0.170 0.018 0.150 0.017 0.090 0.007
t-Statistic -6.016 5.562 18.063 5.862 55.952 13.744
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Independent Variable TP ∆TP CP ∆CP CP ∆CP
Coefficient 0.942 0.086 0.919 0.033 0.957 0.097
Std. Error 0.002 0.020 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.003
t-Statistic 418.079 4.406 459.943 4.518 797.498 34.875
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Regression Statistics
R-squared 0.914 0.001 0.928 0.001 0.975 0.069
Adjusted R-squared 0.914 0.001 0.928 0.001 0.975 0.069
S.E. Of regression 14.498 2.241 13.278 2.241 7.967 0.864
Sum square resid 3467636 82572 2908700 82567 1047283 12266
Log Likelihood -67532 -36611 -66082 -36611 -57655 -20927
F-statistic 174790 1.941 211548 2.041 636003 1216
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Model Statistics
AIC 8.186 4.451 8.010 4.451 6.989 2.545
SIC 8.187 4.452 8.011 4.452 6.990 2.546
HQC 8.186 4.452 8.011 4.452 6.989 2.545
Residuals Autocorr.
Durbi-Watson stat 0.027 2.009 0.054 2.005 0.079 1.306
Regression results using panel least squares based upon 16500 balanced panel observations (with a total of 330 periods
included and 50 cross-sections). Panel variables are future prices (FP), target prices (TP) and capitalised prices (CP).
Each column represents a specific panel regression as in Equationeq:egn. We regress FP on TP, FP on CP and TP on CP,
both in levels and differences. We report the model selection criteria of Akaike (1973) (AIC), (Schwarz et al., 1978) (SIC)
and Hannan and Quinn (1979) (HQC). For residual autocorrelation we use the panel data generalization by Bhargava
et al. (1982) of the classical Durbin and Watson (1950) statistic.
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Figure A2: Addidas
(a) FP vs TP
(b) FP vs CP
(c) TP vs CP
Individual time series regressions using three prices series on Adidas: future prices (FP) ist target prices (TP) capitalised
prices (CP) forecasts. On the left-hand-side images of level regressions and on the right-hand-side of regressions in
differences.
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Figure A3: Anheuser
(a) FP vs TP
(b) FP vs CP
(c) TP vs CP
Individual time series regressions using three prices series on Anheuser: future prices (FP) ist target prices (TP) capitalised
prices (CP) forecasts. On the left-hand-side images of level regressions and on the right-hand-side of regressions in
differences.
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Figure A4: ASML
(a) FP vs TP
(b) FP vs CP
(c) TP vs CP
Individual time series regressions using three prices series on ASML: future prices (FP) ist target prices (TP) capitalised
prices (CP) forecasts. On the left-hand-side images of level regressions and on the right-hand-side of regressions in
differences.
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Figure A5: Essilor
(a) FP vs TP
(b) FP vs CP
(c) TP vs CP
Individual time series regressions using three prices series on Essilor: future prices (FP) ist target prices (TP) capitalised
prices (CP) forecasts. On the left-hand-side images of level regressions and on the right-hand-side of regressions in
differences.
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Figure A6: Fresenius
(a) FP vs TP
(b) FP vs CP
(c) TP vs CP
Individual time series regressions using three prices series on Fresenius: future prices (FP) ist target prices (TP) capitalised
prices (CP) forecasts. On the left-hand-side images of level regressions and on the right-hand-side of regressions in
differences.
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Figure A7: Inditex
(a) FP vs TP
(b) FP vs CP
(c) TP vs CP
Individual time series regressions using three prices series on Inditex: future prices (FP) ist target prices (TP) capitalised
prices (CP) forecasts. On the left-hand-side images of level regressions and on the right-hand-side of regressions in
differences.
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Figure A8: Safran
(a) FP vs TP
(b) FP vs CP
(c) TP vs CP
Individual time series regressions using three prices series on Safran: future prices (FP) ist target prices (TP) capitalised
prices (CP) forecasts. On the left-hand-side images of level regressions and on the right-hand-side of regressions in
differences.
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Figure A9: Volkswagen
(a) FP vs TP
(b) FP vs CP
(c) TP vs CP
Individual time series regressions using three prices series on Volkswagen: future prices (FP) ist target prices (TP)
capitalised prices (CP) forecasts. On the left-hand-side images of level regressions and on the right-hand-side of regressions
in differences.
